Excerpts are from Bill Freseman's DESRON 60 Notes for War Diary.

DESRON 60 Notes for War Diary

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            2155  c/s 8 knots.

2215   Received message from CTF 77 reporting Jap convoy of 7 AKs and 5 cruisers or destroyers about 150 miles north of ORMOC BAY and proceeding in that direction.  It appeared that this convoy might arrive shortly after landing.

         2300  CDS 21 and Tasmania group increased speed and proceeded toward ORMOC BAY to make attack.  The Tasmania group was expected to create a diversion and distract the attention of any Jap planes in the area from our convoy.

2330  WALKE reported possible sub contact and dropped full pattern of depth charges.

7 December 1944

          0023  c/c 000^oT.  Proceeding through narrow CANIGAO STRAIT.

          0155  Sighted numerous white flares ahead - apparently in ORMOC BAY and probably being dropped on Tasmania group.  Also observed flashes from gunfire.

          Received report from Tasmania group that no shipping had been encountered in ORMOC BAY and that Tasmania group was retiring toward the west.

0258  c/s 8.5 knots to allow formation to close up.

          0316  Several Jap snooper planes reported by CONYNGHAM and CTU 78.3.6,  but p1anes did not make any attacks.

          0450  Ordered LAFFEY and O'BRIEN to move up behind minesweepers as supporting ships.

          0457  c/c 328⁰T.

          0514  OTC ordered H-Hour to be postponed from 0650 to 0700.  

          0518  All ships ordered to turn off SC radar.

          0526  OTC ordered fire support destroyers to increase time of bombardment from 20 to 30 minutes, and ammunition allowance from 200 to 300 rounds.

          0535  c/s 6 knots.

          0540  Several small barges sighted along coast.  Appeared to resemble LSMS, but EDWARDS was ordered to identify further.

          0600  An AM reported possible sound contact.

          0610  OTC ordered task group to deploy and al1 ships proceeded to assigned stations.  (see diagram 2).

                       All ships were on station by 0630 ready for bombardment and launching landing craft. Much to the amazement of all no enemy opposition has yet been encountered and as dawn broke over ORMOC BAY there were not even any signs of life anywhere along the shore.  Apparently the Japs were caught completely by surprise.

            0613   All ships ordered to resume use of SC radar.

               0622   The minesweeper reported one full pattern had been dropped and 20 seconds after pattern had detonated there was a violent unexplained explosion.

         0625  H-Hour delayed l0 minutes by OTC to provide additional light, after requesting recommendation of Comdesron 60.

         0634  Observed light firing on bench - the first sign of enemy opposition.

         0640  Destroyers in fire support group opened fire on assigned targets.

         0655  LAMSON reported town of ALBUERA full of Japs and was ordered by Comdesron 60 to fire into the town and clean it out.

         0656  Jap 3" battery opened up on BARTON - one- shell whistled over bridge and landed about 100 yards off starboard bow. Other shells landed close and short.

         0656  Air cover of P-40s arrived over Port BELLLO.  BARTON opened fire on these planes by mistake, and was followed by two other DDs.

         0709  Ordered DDs to life fire as first wave started for landing. Rocket ships fired rockets on landing beach resultant great noise, flame, and smoke.

         0710  Observed barge underway near ORMOC town  and ordered O'BRIEN to take it under fire.

         0715  Jap battery on hillside south of ORMOC firing on ships, spotted and taken under fire by BARTON and LAFFEY. No further opposition until later.

          0720   Ordered O'BRIEN  to sink number of barges observed along shore south of ORM0C.

        0720  LSMs commenced landing on beach.

        0730  LCIs commenced landing on beach.

        0740  APDs recovered all boats and proceeded to take screening stations.

        0740  LAMSON reported she had fired accidentally on her spotting plane and caused sufficient damage to force plane to return to base.

             0750   Minesweepers assigned to search ORMOC BAY reported no enemy activity observed, and no camouflaged ships along west coast of bay.

             0800   All APDs reported landing troops with no casualties.

             0806   Jap convoy reported northwest of LEYTE, and O'BRIEN and WALKE ordered to investigate.  Further information revealed convoy 45 miles away and Army Air Force assumed responsibility for destroying this target.  Orders to O'BRIEN and WALKE cancelled.

             0820   First enemy air attack occured when LAMSON and FLUSSER reported Jap bomber in sight.  Plane taken under fire and driven off toward the west.  When last seen it was very low being dived on by P-38s, and was probably destroyed.  This plane was undoubtedly a search plane which was able to relay a contact report for it was not until one hour and 20 minutes later that the first heavy air attack occurred.

           0835   All ships reported to CTF 77 they were in contact with SFCP and ready to receive assignments.

           0900   CTG 78.3 reported to CTF 77 that favorable progress was being made and that unloading would be completed by 1000.  All Army personnel were put ashore without incurring a single casualty.  The unloading operation was conducted with precision and despatch and the combination of the surprise of the landing minimum of resistance, and effective bombardment, produced the successful result obtained.

                        Shore Fire Control Party reported light resistance on right hand sector.  Bridge on left flank secured but partly mined and blown.  One company met slight opposition near highway, but all groups had reached Phase One Line.

                        At 0930 Army reported bridge north toward IPIL secured and resistance sporadic.

           0944   Group of 8 Jap twin-engine bombers covered by four Zekes were sighted over APALI POINT.

                       They were immediately attacked by three P-38s and three Zekes were shot down in rapid succession.  However, three bombers suicide crashed the WARD (APD) and four more crashed the MAHAN setting large fires on both ships.  The two remaining planes fled toward the northwest closely pursued by P-38s.  One seemed about to crash as the planes disappeared from view and was probably downed.

                O'BRIEN and WALKE ordered to assist WARD and MAHAN respectively. The CROSBY and SCHLEY were also standing by the WARD. WARD and MAHAN were both being abandoned as fires were spreading and danger of explosion was great. Ammunition was exploding in the MAHAN.

       1007  7 planes reported closing formation by LAMSON but were driven off by P-38s before they closed within gun range.

         1015   LCIs completed unloading and were ordered to proceed to rrendezvous area.

         1016  LAMSON ordered to take MAHAN's station as fighter director ship near APALI POINT.

         1016  Two APDs reported possible sub contact but were unable to develop for attack.

       1018  WALKE reported MAHAN beyond salvage possibility.

         1034  O'BRIEN and WALKE ordered to pick up all survivors, and to be careful of endangering own ships.

       1047  O'BRIEN reported she believed it would be possible to put fire out on WARD. She was using all available hoses and foam extinguishers.

       1058  CONYNGHAM returned to beach to fire as directed by SFCP.

       1112  CTG 78.3 ordered all ships to form cruising disposition for retirement immediately.

       1114  SMITH reported Jap planes attacking formation. Unable to determine results, but it is probable that LIDDLE was hit during this raid.

       1116  0'BRIEN reported no progress with fire and was ordered to sink WARD with gunfire.

         1119  OTC gave course as 148^oT speed 6 knots.

         1120  Observed one Jap plane crash attempting to dive on SMITH.

       1130  All screening ships rejoining formation  except O'BRIEN, WALKE and LAMSON who was assisting WALKE. BARTON remained behind to cover O'BRIEN and WALKE and to herd a tardy LC1 and LSM.

       1132  C0FER reported she was going to the assistance of the LIDDLE (APD) who had been crashed by suicide plane during last raid. The bridge was completely destroyed and all officers except two killed. It was impossible to establish visual or radio communications and she was maneuvering so erratically that it was dangerous to attempt to come alongside.  As all means of signalling was out, and no officers visible, it was impossible to stop her.

       1136  FLUSSER reported two groups of planes approaching on bearings 295^o T and 265^o T approximately 30 miles away.

                In contrast to the early success of the operation and the apparent lack of opposition, the situation was becoming increasingly more serious. A destroyer and an APD had already been lost with another APD heavily damaged.  Admiral STRUBIE was attempting to get the retiring disposition formed and underway as soon as possible.  With more time it might have been possible to salvage the WARD, but Jap air attacks were becoming more frequent and an greater danger lay in losing one of the destroyers rescuing the WARD and MAHAN survivors.  Consequently the WALKE and O'BRIEN were ordered to expedite their jobs as much as possible.

         1137  HERBERT reported Jap pilot in water and was ordered to pick him up. Later reported prisoner in good condition.

       1145  0'BRIEN sank WARD which disappeared in a violent explosion. A strange coincidence occurred in this action as the CO of the 0'BRIEN, Comdr. OUTERBRIDGE, had been CO of the WARD on Dec. 7, 1941, and in addition now three years later to the day (Pearl Harbor Day), he was obliged to sink his old ship by gunfire.

       1208  WALKE reported 20 officers and 216 enlisted men on board survivors from MAHAN and in addition one Navy and one Army F.D. officer. Total dead or missing one officer and nine enlisted men. MAHAN sunk by torpedo.

0'BRIEN, WALKE, and LAMSON rejoining formation.

               WARD survivors included 6 officers, 40 men in O'BRIEN, 6 officers in CROSBY, and 47 men in SCHLEY.

       1215  OTC ordered Screen Commander to use all AMs and APDs, as well as DDs, in screen.

       1215  Two Jap planes taken under fire by screen. Results not observed.

     1220  Ordered Comdesron 5 to assume charge of screen until BARTON rejoined.

     1241  c/c 190^o T.

     1246  LLOYD and COFER reported they were still trying to get alongside LIDDLE with not much success.  OTC ordered DDs to take following assignments in screen: 1 BARTON,2 O'BRIEN, 3 LAFFEY, 4 WALKE, 6 SMITH, 7 FLUSSER, 8 REID, 9 LAMSON, 11 EDWARDS, 12 CONYNGHAM.

        1311  COFER reported to LIDDLE now under full control and able to proceed under own power.    

      1312  Ordered CTU 78.3.6 to station minesweepers between stations 1 and 2, 1 and 3, 3 and 5, 2 and 4, 4 and 6, and one each in stations 5 and 10.

      1315  Ordered EDWARDS to cover LLOYD and COFER until boats had been picked up.

        1320  Ordered ComTransDiv 100 to station his APDs along port side of convoy close aboard, and ComTransDiv 103 to station his units along starboard side.

        1331  c/s 8 knots.